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1. Introduction 
In Lycan (2001) a simple deductive argument for the higher-order representation theory of state 
consciousness (HOR) is presented. Lycan takes the argument to be valid for his own and similar 
‘inner sense’ accounts of HOR (cf. Armstrong 1981; Lycan 1996, 2004) as well as for Rosenthal’s 
higher-order thought version (see e.g. Rosenthal 1997, 2004, 2005). From a so called first-order 
representational perspective on state consciousness (FOR) Lurz (2001) presents an argument 
against Lycan’s account. I demonstrate that Lurz’ argument gives a misinterpretation of HOR and 
that his FOR-compatible account does not capture the self-presentational structure of state 
consciousness, a structure implied by the stipulative definition of state consciousness shared by him 
and Lycan. Although Lurz’ argumentation fails, Lycan’s argument can be shown to be non-valid for 
another simple reason. Hence both accounts of state consciousness are defective.  
 
In the next section I briefly clarify what the notion ‘state consciousness’ is taken to mean and 
present two much discussed features of conscious states: Phenomenal character and the self-
presentational structure of such states. In section 3 the general agenda for FOR and HOR – what 
unites them and what divides them - is spelled out with emphasize on the issue about the self-
presentational structure of conscious states. This feature plays an axiomatic role for Lurz’ and 
Lycan’s arguments and is the touchstone in my critique. Section 4 presents Lycan’s argument. In 
section 5 I give an exposition of the premisses in Lurz’ argument against Lycan. Section 6 proceeds 
with a demonstration that Lurz’ critique of Lycan’s argument is defective. Section 7 is a critique of 
Lurz’ version of FOR. Lycan’s argument is demonstrated non-valid in section 8. Section 9 sums up.  
 
2. State consciousness – the notion and the explanandum 
What does the term ‘state consciousness’ denote? In philosophy of mind there is a widespread 
agreement to the effect that there is a difference between ascribing the property ‘consciousness’ to 
creatures and to mental states. (cf. e.g. Bayne & Chalmers 2003, Block 1995, Carruthers 2005, 
Dretske 1995, Gennaro 1995, Jacob 1999, Kriegel 2004, Lurz 2004, Lycan 1996, Manson 2000, 
Rosenthal 2005, Van Gulick 1995). First, an animal or a human being can be described as being 
conscious, by which we mean, roughly, that the subject considered as a type or token is awake. 
Second, some subjects are also routinely characterized as being conscious of things and state of 
affairs: By having a perceptual mental state, a creature can be said to be conscious of some parcel of 
its environment. A creature’s being conscious and a creature’s being conscious of something are 
different characterizations of the subject as such. But third, mental states themselves can also have 
the property of being conscious.  
 
“When we describe desires, fears, and experiences as being conscious or unconscious we attribute 
or deny consciousness, not to a being, but to some state, condition, or process in that being. States 
(processes, etc.), unlike the creatures in which they occur, are not conscious of anything or that 
anything is so although their occurrence in a creature may make that creature conscious of 
something or that something is so.” (Dretske 1995: 98). 
 
Put somewhat differently, if mental states are properties of creatures, properties of those states are 
second-order properties of the creatures harboring such states. Therefore consciousness as a 
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property of a mental state is different from those properties of a creature we ascribe to it when we 
say it is conscious (period) or conscious of something. So, even if there exists a relation of 
interdependency between the ascription of, say, a creature’s being conscious of something and its 
being in a conscious state, these properties are distinct. Our matter of concern can now be raised: 
What is, then, this property of consciousness attributed to mental states (for short: ‘state 
consciousness’)? What are the characteristic features of a conscious state, to be more precise about 
the explanandum?  
 
In recent discussions of the prospects for representational reductionism two features have been in 
focus. These features are the so called phenomenal character and a certain self-presentational 
structure both of which have been claimed to characterize conscious states. The phenomenal 
character of a conscious state is that there is something it is like for the subject to have that 
experience (pace Nagel 1974). When you are looking at a banana there is something it is like for 
you to have that particular experience of yellow, the claim goes.1 The claim about the self-
presentational structure of consciousness is that a subject’s having a conscious state implies that the 
subject is aware of being in that state.2 This claim is essential for HOR’s explanation of state 
consciousness, but is typically denied by FOR. But before turning to that issue, what is 
representationalism, generally spoken?  
 
3. Representationalism – the explanans 
What does a representational reduction of state consciousness amount to? FOR and HOR claim that 
all the features of a conscious state should and can be exhaustively accounted for in terms of the 
representational properties of the state itself and/or another state representing that state, added a 
number of functional constraints. This perspective is different from a straight reduction of 
consciousness to physical or neurological properties; instead, consciousness is claimed to be 
reducible to intentional and functional relations: 
 
“[…] in seeking to explain phenomenal consciousness in terms of properties of neural events in the 
brain we would be trying to leap over too many explanatory levels at once. […] It is now a familiar 
idea in the philosophy of science that there are levels of phenomena in nature, with each level being 
realized in the one below it, and with each level having its characteristic properties and processes 
explicable in terms of the one below it. […] Seen in this light, then what we should expect is that 
phenomenal consciousness will be reductively explicable in terms of intentional contents and 
causal-role psychology, if it is explicable at all.” (Carruthers 2005: 6).     
 
The representationalists then, in a second move, further explain - or consider it possible somehow to 
explain - these intentional and functional features in informational and/or teleological relations 
between brain states and physical states of the environment.  
 
In accordance with the FOR version of representationalism, when I look at a banana, what it is like 
for me to have that experience is basically a matter of the state’s having a certain sort of 
representational content. The phenomenal character of the conscious state is claimed either to be 
                                                          
1 While phenomenal character is an acclaimed mark of conscious states of a sensory kind, many philosophers deny that 
pure cognitive conscious states like thoughts and beliefs exhibit this feature. 
2 In this paper the expressions ’aware of’ and ’conscious of’ are used synonymously in formulation of the self-
presentational structure of conscious states. This is also the case when it comes to HOR’s turning this formulation into 
an explicit explanatory account of  state consciousness. A practice licensed by representationalists of both sorts; see e.g. 
Rosenthal (2004: 41, note 4); Dretske (1995: 98); Lycan (1996: 3).  
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nothing above the content of that state or to supervene on that content, added some functional 
constraints. Some FOR proponents have hypothesized that a content of a conscious state must be of 
a non-conceptual kind and have a non-symbolic, fine-grained, picture-like format (see e.g. Dretske, 
1995; Kirk 1994, and Tye 1995, 2000). In addition the content is typically claimed to have the 
functional role that it is available for further cognitive and conative states in the subject (Kirk 1994; 
Tye 1995, 2000).  
Against FOR however, HOR proponents argue that such kinds of representational relations are not 
sufficient to explain state consciousness. Another type of representational relation is required to 
explain what it is for mental states to be conscious, with their characteristic features of phenomenal 
character and self-presentational structure. And HOR’s hypothesis is that necessarily, for a mental 
state to be conscious, the presence of that state must be represented by another state. A meta-
representation is needed, which is the rationale behind the name ‘higher-order representation 
theory’. According to HOR a subject S is in a conscious mental state M1 iff S by having a mental 
state M2 in a suitable way W is aware of being in M1, where ‘aware of’ indicates the 
representational relation between M1 and M2 and ‘W’ is placeholder for the different specific HOR 
suggestions concerning the precise nature of this relation. Thus the divide between HOR and FOR 
can be seen to turn on whether or not the existence of a meta-representation is deemed necessary in 
order for a mental state to be conscious.  
Why should we wish to ‘go HOR’? Defenders of HOR point out that their explanatory sketch 
simply reflects a pre-theoretically acceptable mark of state consciousness – namely what I have 
called the self-presentational structure of a conscious state. Clearly HOR proponents take this 
feature as pre-theoretically vindicated. Lycan states that he can’t hear a natural sense of the phrase 
‘conscious state’ other than as meaning ‘state one is conscious of being in’ (Lycan 1996: 25), and 
similarly Rosenthal declares that:  
 
“whatever else we may discover about consciousness, it’s clear that, if one is totally unaware of 
some mental state, that state is not a conscious state” (Rosenthal 2002: 408).  
 
Now, one thing is whether or not HOR’s explanation of state conscicousness is correct. Another is 
whether the structure of self-presentation is correct as an initial characterization of the 
explanandum. Certainly not all FOR proponents assent to this pretheoretical ’mark of state 
consciousness’. As Lycan points out, Dretske does not (Lycan 2001: 3, note 1) Neither does Tye 
(cf. Tye 1995: 5-6) or Kirk (2005: 216).  
The question is whether it is possible to defend a FOR account without denying the HOR’s 
axiomatic claim about the self-presentational structure of a conscious state. This is what Lurz 
(2001) claims and Lycan (2001) denies.   
 
4. Lycan’s argument for HOR 
Lycan presents his argument for HOR in the following way: 
 
(1) A conscious state is a mental state whose subject is aware of being in it. [Stipulative definition] 
 
This premiss lends expression to Lycan’s acceptance of the claim about the self-presentational 
structure of a conscious state.   
 
(2) The ’of’ in (1) is the ’of’ of intentionality; what one is aware of is an intentional object of the 
awareness. 
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(3) Intentionality is representation; a state has a thing as its intentional object only if it represents 
that thing. 
 
Therefore, 
 
(4) Awareness of a mental state is a representation of that state. [2,3] 
 
And therefore, 
 
(5) A conscious state is a state that is itself represented by another of the subject’s mental states. 
[1,4]    
 
Lycan’s challenge to the opponent of HOR is: If he accepts (1), but wishes to reject (5), which one 
of the premisses (2) and (3) will he abandon?  
 
5. Lurz’ argument against Lycan 
Lurz (2001) argues against Lycan by pointing out two different readings of (1): A higher-order 
reading of ’aware of’ which makes Lycan’s argument valid, and a ’lower-order reading’, according 
to which S’s awareness of his mental state M simply is S’s awareness of what his mental state M 
represents, and as such lends no support to HOR. Let me expose what I take Lurz’ premisses to be 
before I state my case against his argument: 
 
Lurz’ first three premisses - let me denote them (L1), (L2) and (L3) - are identical with (1), (2) and 
(3) respectively.  
 
(L4) ’A subject’s state of awareness of X’ (Where X has representational content) can be read as ’A 
subject’s state of awareness of what X represents’. 
 
(L5) A subject’s state of awareness of what X represents is not equivalent to the subject’s state of 
awareness that X represents such-and-such or equivalent to a state of awareness as of X’s 
representing such-and-such.3  
 
(L6) A subject’s state of awareness of his mental state M is not necessarily a state of awareness that 
M represents such-and-such. [L4, L5]  
 
Therefore,  
 
(L7) A subject’s state of awareness of his mental state M is not necessarily a state that is a 
representation of M. [L2, L3, L6] 
 
Thus, since Lurz’ lower-order reading of (1) does not affect the supposed truth of Lycan’s 
premisses (2) or (3) - occurring as (L2) and (L3) - Lycan’s sentence (4) does not logically follow 
                                                          
 
3 Lurz’ disjunction between ‘awareness that something represents such-and-such’ and ‘awareness as of something 
representing such-and-such’ is borrowed from McGinn (1982) and is introduced to capture the difference between 
thought- and perceptual versions of HOR respectively (Lurz 2001: 315). The distinction neither plays a role for Lurz’ 
argument against HOR nor for my case against Lurz. It will therefore be ignored in what follows. 
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from his premisses (1)-(3). According to Lurz a subject’s state of awareness of his mental state M 
might be read as a state of awareness of what his mental state M represents. And for a subject to be 
in a state of awareness that represents the content of his mental state M, it is not the case that the 
subject is in a further representational state that represents M as such:  
 
”Hence, the subject is not in a higher-order representational state when he is simply aware of what 
his mental state M represents […] it is not a representation of the mental state M as such – no more 
so than one’s awareness of what a trompe l’oeil painting represents is a representation of the trompe 
l’oeil painting as such.” (Lurz 2001: 316)  
 
From this Lurz’ conclusion immediately follows: 
 
(L8) A subject’s having a conscious state is not necessarily to have a mental state M that is itself 
represented by another of the subject’s mental states; that is: HOR as expressed in (5) does not 
logically follow from the premisses (1-4). [L1,L7] 
 
Thus, Lycan’s deductive argument for HOR fails.    
 
6. A first reply to Lurz 
Lurz’ argument against Lycan is invalid since his higher-order reading is a misinterpretation of 
HOR.  Lurz’ higher-order reading can be rejected without rejecting HOR as such. This is so because 
HOR does not claim that awareness of M is to be explained in terms of awareness that M 
represents such-and-such. Thus the proponent of HOR might embrace the general distinction stated 
in (L5) between awareness of what something represents and awareness that it represents such-and-
such, as well as this distinction applied to mental states, that is (L6), without this implying (L7) and 
(L8). It is not part of Lycan’s argument that awareness of M - in terms of having a representation 
with the intentional object M - is to be understood as awareness that M represents such-and-such.  
To read HOR’s notion of ‘awareness of M’ in terms of ‘awareness that M represents-such-and-
such’ is to read HOR as putting forward an explanation of a subject’s state consciousness in terms 
of the subject’s having explicit awareness of M as representing such-and-such. There is a word for 
this specific kind of awareness of one’s ongoing mental states as representing such-and-such, which 
is introspection. A state of ongoing introspection is a conscious mental state. But not all conscious 
states are states of ongoing introspection. The claim that a conscious state is identical with an 
ongoing state of introspection is untenable. If true, all mental states except those where the subject 
has explicit awareness of the fact that it’s having a mental state should be deemed unconscious, 
which makes state consciousness a rather rarely occurring phenomenon. On the contrary, when we 
introspect our mental states, they are conscious to begin with. Lurz’ reading of HOR’s notion 
‘awareness of M’ in terms of ‘awareness that M represents such-and-such’ (L6) implicitly presents 
HOR as an explanation of state consciousness by way of the subject’s having introspective 
consciousness. But this reading puts HOR’s card before the horse: such an explanation would be 
circular. HOR is an attempt to explain state consciousness in terms of a second-order representation 
of the state in question, wherefore state consciousness itself should not be introduced at the second-
order representational level as a part of the explanans of the first-order state consciousness. 
Hence, while Lurz is right in pointing out that ‘S’s awareness of what M represents’ is not 
equivalent to ‘S’s awareness that M represents such-and-such’ (L6), he is wrong when he takes 
HOR to explain state consciousness in terms of the latter.  
The higher-order thought version of HOR clearly acknowledges a distinction between a conscious 
state and an introspective state of consciousness, where the latter denotes a state in which a subject 
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is aware that his mental state is representing such-and-such (cf. Rosenthal 1997: 730, 745-746; 
Rosenthal 2000; Gennaro 1995: 16-21). But the inner sense version of HOR acknowledges this 
distinction as well. Unfortunately, however, Lycan and David Armstrong have both used the 
locution ‘introspection’ (as well as terms like ‘scanning’, ‘inner perception’ and ‘monitoring’) to 
describe the activity by which a subject’s mental states are rendered conscious for it according to 
the perceptual version of HOR. This is unfortunate, since it might lead someone to misrepresent 
HOR as a thesis where introspective consciousness holds a position either as explanandum (which 
is false) or as explanans (which is viciously circular). The last option is an implicit part of Lurz’ 
argument against Lycan. In fact, though, Armstrong makes a clarifying distinction between ‘reflex’ 
introspective awareness and ‘introspection proper’, a clearing up which Lycan points out too (Lycan 
1996: 162-163, note 2):  
 
“It is a plausible hypothesis that the latter [‘introspection proper’] will normally involve not only 
introspective awareness of mental states and activities but also introspective awareness of that 
introspective awareness.” (Armstrong 1981: 63).  
 
Put in Armstrong’s terms: By attributing an ‘introspection proper’ reading of ‘awareness of one’s 
own mental state’ to HOR, Lurz’ case against HOR is valid: Since a subject’s state of awareness of 
his mental state M is not necessarily a state of awareness that M represents such-and-such (L6),  
(L7) and (L8) follow immediately and Lycan’s deductive argument for HOR fails.  
But if one adopts Armstrong’s ‘reflex’-introspective reading of ‘awareness of one’s own mental 
state’ instead, a subject is said to be consciously aware of what his mental state M represents by 
being aware of M - a reading which does not lead to (L7) and (L8). In Armstrong’s famous example 
of the absent-minded driver, who suddenly - after a long time of driving without awareness of what 
he has been doing - ‘comes to’ and realizes what he is doing, the lack of awareness of the ongoing 
perceptual representations is a lack of ‘reflex’ introspective awareness (see Armstrong 1981: 59-
60). The driver is absent-minded in a double sense: He is not consciously aware of the road, 
although he is still having unconscious representations of it while driving. The road is the object 
represented by his first-order perceptual states.4 Secondly, he is not aware of these first-order states. 
But, according to HOR, it is only because of one’s becoming aware of the latter that one is 
consciously aware of what they represent - and did unconsciously represent all along - namely the 
road.  
Certainly there is a difference between being aware of what a trompe l’oeil painting represents and 
being aware that a painting represents such-and-such (L5). But this is a false analogy to HOR since 
a subject needs not be aware that he is having a representation of a mental state in order for the 
mental state to be conscious by having a representation of it.5 To put it metaphorically: Lurz’ 
higher-order reading of HOR is simply too high.  
 
7. A second reply to Lurz 
Lurz might object that even if his higher-order reading illustrates a misconception of HOR along the 
lines indicated above, his argument has still teeth against the ‘true HOR account’. This is so because 
he also argues via positiva for FOR:  
                                                          
4 In Armstrong’s terminology, the absent-minded driver has ’perceptual consciousness’ of the road. ”Above all, how is 
it possible to drive a car for kilometres along a road if one cannot perceive that road?” (Armstrong 1981: 60).  
5 Likewise David Rosenthal’s higher-order thought version of HOR does not imply that the second-order thoughts 
necessary for the first-order states to become conscious need themselves be conscious, although these second-order 
states might sometimes themselves in turn become conscious by the subject’s having third-order thoughts about them 
(Rosenthal 1997: 742). 
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(L9) All cases supporting a higher-order reading of the expression ‘S’s awareness of M’ in (L1) can 
be interpreted in the lower-order way as well, that is, as instances of ‘awareness of what M 
represents’. And this reading is in accordance with a FOR account of state consciousness.  
 
Therefore  
 
(L10) There is no reason for accepting the higher-order reading of the expression ’S’s awareness of 
M’ in (L1) over the lower-order reading except by begging the question against the FOR account of 
state consciousness.   
 
Thus, even if Lurz’ own higher-order reading of HOR is mistaken, it might be true that all cases 
supporting ‘true readings of HOR’ can be interpreted in the suggested lower-order way, a way 
which conforms with a FOR account. Lurz takes it as a fact that we use the expressions ‘aware of’ 
and ‘aware of what’ interchangeably, a fact which lends abductive support for the hypothesis that 
these locutions really do express the same idea (Lurz 2001: 317). Accordingly there would be no 
reason except by begging the question against FOR for accepting any higher-order reading of ‘state 
of awareness of his mental state’ (Lurz 2001: 317-318).  
Against this I argue that (L9) must be rejected. By adopting Lurz’ lower-order interpretation of (L1) 
his stipulative definition of state consciousness is rendered incomprehensible as a criterion for 
distinguishing between conscious and unconscious mental states. Therefore (L10) is false.  
 
Consider what Lurz’ presents as the basis for his claim that ‘aware of’ and ‘aware of what’ are used 
interchangeably: 
  
“Whenever we find it natural to say of a subject who is distracted, for instance, that she is not aware 
of perceiving some item or fact (which she is in fact perceiving), we find it just as natural to say that 
she is not aware of what she is perceiving when she is perceiving the item or fact. And vice versa.” 
(Lurz 2001: 316). 
 
Lurz points out that this fact is indeed exemplified by the wording of David Armstrong and Peter 
Carruthers in their descriptions of the absent-minded driver case (Lurz 2001: 316-317).6  
But first, this is not to say that ‘aware of’ and ‘aware of what’ are used interchangeably when 
someone is (consciously) perceiving. From the fact that the expression ‘S is not aware of perceiving 
some x’ is used interchangeably with ‘S is not aware of the x he is perceiving’ it does not follow 
that the expressions ‘S is aware of perceiving some x’ and ‘S is aware of the x he is perceiving’ are 
used interchangeably as well.  
Second, there is a reason why Lurz should acknowledge this distinction. If S is not, some way or 
another, aware of his perceiving, he is not consciously perceiving x. To substitute ‘S’s awareness of 
what M represents’ for S’s awareness of M’ leaves us with a reading of (L1) by which we no longer 
have a criterion for distinguishing between instances of conscious and unconscious mental states. 
Lycan and Lurz agree upon the stipulative definition of state consciousness: (L1)=(1). Both of them 
believe that this premiss states a ‘mark of state consciousness’ which gives us a non-question 
begging first handle on the difference between conscious and unconscious states. Now, by adopting 
Lurz’ lower-order reading of  (L1) it gets the following form:  
                                                          
6 See Armstrong op.cit. and (Carruthers 1989: 258). See also (Carruthers 2000: 149) for a similar description. 
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(L1*) A conscious state is a mental state whose subject is aware of what M represents. 
 
But when a subject has an unconscious mental state he might also be said to be aware of what the 
state represents. Certainly the unconscious driver too might be described as being perceptually 
aware of the road, other cars, curves, etc. Lurz clearly accepts the existence of unconscious mental 
states. He describes, with HOR, the unconscious driver’s visual states in terms of ‘perceiving’ and 
seeing’ (Lurz 2001: 315, 317).  So, by accepting (L1*), what is the difference between conscious 
and unconscious mental states? It would be truly unhelpful and circular to modify (L1*) to ‘a 
conscious mental state is a mental state whose subject is consciously aware of what M represents’, 
in order to explain the difference. Thus, where (L1) captures such a difference, (L1*) does not. 
When Lurz interprets (L1) - a premiss acceptable to both HOR and FOR - in terms of (L1*) he 
leaves his own stipulatively defined ‘mark of state consciousness’ behind. A reading of (L1), which 
implies that S is aware of his mental state M, runs the risk of wiping out the distinction between 
conscious and unconscious mental states. As exemplified by Lurz’ lower-order account. Hence (L9) 
must be rejected, and, contrary to (L10), Lurz’ lower-order reading of (L1) does not pose a threat to 
a HOR account of state consciousness.  
Lurz describes (L1) as reflecting ‘our pre-theoretical intuitions about state consciousness’ (Lurz 
2001: 314). That is, (L1) reflects a non-explanatory criterion by which we distinguish between 
conscious and unconscious mental states. Since (L1*) no longer reflects this distinction, (L1*) is 
not, strictly speaking, a reading of (L1) at all. Lurz’ lower-order reading is simply too low. 
 
8. A reply to Lycan 
Although I take Lurz’ argument against HOR to be defective, I am not satisfied with Lycan’s 
argument myself. His argument is not valid.   
Consider again Lycan’s premisses and the challenge posed: If the opponent of HOR accepts (1), but 
wishes to reject (5), which one of the premisses (2) and (3) will he abandon?  
 
My answer to Lycan’s challenge is that neither of the premisses (2) and (3) has to be rejected in 
order to show that the conclusion (5) does not follow. From (1)-(4) it might still be the case that 
when a subject is in a conscious state – that is, a mental state whose subject is aware of being in it 
(1) – this very state represents itself to the subject as one he is aware of being in. According to such 
an account of state consciousness, no further mental state is needed for this representation.7 From 
acceptance of the subject’s awareness of the state as an intentional relation (2) and understanding 
this relation as the subject’s having a representation of the state in question (3), it does not follow 
that the conscious state does not represent itself to the subject. Certainly defenders of HOR argue 
against this possibility for other reasons. But (5) cannot be deduced solely from (1)-(4). Acceptance 
of the proposition that awareness of a mental state is a representation of that state (4), does not 
necessarily imply that the representation in question is carried out by another of the subject’s 
mental states, as (5) says. So, yes, Lurz is right: Lycan’s argument is defective, but not because (4) 
does not logically follow from Lycan’s premisses (1)-(3), as Lurz suggests. The reason is that (5) 
does not follow from (4).  
A deductive shortcut to HOR has not been brought to light yet. 
 
                                                          
7 Such an account can be found in Brentano (1874). For recent version see Thomasson (2000) and Lehrer (2002). For a 
discussion of this view in contrast with HOR, see Kriegel (2006). Indeed Kriegel & Williford (2006) is a collection of 
papers all of which in different ways address this issue.. 
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9. Conclusion 
Lurz’ case against HOR fails for two reasons: First, his higher-order reading misrepresents HOR as 
a theory about introspective consciousness. Second, his lower-order reading does not account for 
the stipulative definition of state consciousness. This reading does not reflect a conception of state 
consciousness by which we can distinguish a conscious from an unconscious mental state. Thus, on 
the one hand, Lurz’ argument against HOR is defective and his FOR account does not lend 
expression to the self-presentational structure of a conscious state stipulated in the definition of this 
term.  
On the other hand, though, Lycan’s argument is non-valid anyway. A theory of state consciousness 
in which the presentational structure of consciousness is accounted for by the mental state’s 
representing itself is not an instance of HOR.8 In other words, from the fact that S’s awareness of a 
mental state is a representation of that state it does not follow that this representation is carried out 
by S’s having another mental state: HOR does not follow. Hence both of the considered arguments 
by Lycan and Lurz are defective. 
 
Perhaps other versions of FOR or HOR can lend us the explanation of state consciousness. Whether 
this is the case remains to be shown.  
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